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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The dissenting opinion indicated that it is very difficult to
establish degrees of election interference, and that if reliance is
placed upon mere technicalities, no definite standard can be de-
veloped upon which to predicate future results.
Available statistics indicate that of 212 re-run elections held
because of employer misconduct, the objecting union was successful
in only thirty per cent, and that of the total votes cast, the union
picked up only an additional two per cent.28 It would appear from
these statistics that re-run elections are not an adequate remedy
for the aggrieved union. The Board has contended in the past that
regardless of the length of delay before a re-run election, the em-
ployer's prior unfair labor practices are never quite forgotten, and
that these practices influence the free choice of employees in any
subsequent election. 27 Considering that the instant case reduces the
availability of the bargaining order to instances of "aggravated"
unfair labor practices by the employer, one can conclude that it
represents a setback for unions in the courts. However, Flomatic
was decided on narrow factual grounds, and will have an effect in
only a small percentage of cases. When the facts are more sub-
stantial, and indicate more aggravated types of unfair labor prac-
tices by the employer, Board bargaining orders will be issued.
As a result of the instant case the employer and the union are
on more equal bargaining terms. The goal of the NLRA was to
equalize the bargaining position of both contestants, and the instant
case is a refinement in that direction. The bargaining order will
be issued only when the Board is fairly convinced that the em-
ployer's practices will be a continued influence in preventing the
union from establishing their representative position in a second
election.
REAL PROPERTY - STATUTE EXTINGUISHING REVERTER DE-
cLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL. - Plaintiffs had been holders of prop-
erty subject to a possibility of reverter, which ripened in favor of
defendants. Subsequently, plaintiffs sought a declaration that they
owned the property in fee simple absolute and that the defendants,
a moderate unbalancing of an election by an employer such as there was
in this case, there is no adequate justification for putting the union in a
position to unbalance it the other way to an extreme degree." Id. at
80. 26 Pollitt, NLRB Re-ran Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209, 212
(1963). For an evaluation of the NLRB remedies generally, see McCulloch,
An Evaluation of the Remedies Available to the NLRB, 15 LAB. LJ . 755
(1964).
27See Pollitt, supra note 26, at 223; Note, 72 YA L.E. 1243, 1250,
1257 (1963).
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by failing to comply with the statutory requirement I of filing a
declaration of intention to preserve their interest, were barred from
asserting it. The Court of Appeals held that the filing require-
ment, as retroactively applied in the instant case, was an unconstitu-
tional impairment of the obligation of contract that could not be
justified under the state's police power. Board of Educ. v. Miles,
15 N.Y.2d 364, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965).
A possibility of reverter is a device whereby a grantor can
control the subsequent use of the land which he transfers 2 If the
land is used for any purpose other than that designated by the
grantor, the reverter occurs and the grantor or his heirs are vested
with a possessory estate in the land.' No set formula is required
to create such a limitation, and any words expressing the grantor's
intention will suffice. 4 The restriction may endure forever because
the event named as terminating the estate may never occur in fact.5
Since the use of the land is limited, the marketability of the title
is impaired.6 The problem is especially acute in New York City
where these restrictions may prevent the full development and use
of land consistent with neighboring property.7
Several solutions to this problem have been suggested. One
approach has been legislation providing for the extinguishment of
claims against, and interests in land which arose out of transactions
occurring many years before." Under such a plan, a claimant's
rights may be retained if a preserving notice is recorded within a
specified time period.0 Legislation of this kind may be divided
into two categories. 10 The first, is in the form of a statute of limita-
tions on claims."- The second requires the owner in possession to
show record title in fee simple absolute in himself or in his grantors
1 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 345.
2 The grantor's reversionary interest has been made alienable, devisable
and descendable. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 59.
31958 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW REvIsION ComNu' REP. (B)
16-17.
4 1 TIFFAxy, REAL PROPERTY § 220, at 385 (3d ed. 1939); see WALSi,
REAr PROPERTY § 86, at 140, § 227, at 416 (2d ed. 1937).
5 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 386.6 1958 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW Rm sIoN Comms'N REP. (B)
17.
71958 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW REVIsION CoMm'N REP. (B)
15-16.
8 See, e.g., IOWA CoD- ANN. § 614.17 (Supp. 1964); MicHr. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26.1271-79 (1953); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §541.023 (1947); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 330.15 (1958). For a discussion of title marketability acts, see Annot.,
71 A.L.R.2d 846 (1960).
9 Aigler, Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts, 50 MIcHi. L. REv.
185 (1951).
10 Aigler, A Supplement to Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts-
1951-1957, 56 MicH. L. REV. 225, 229 (1957).
"1E.g., IOWA CoDE ANN. § 614.17 (Supp. 1964) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 330.15
(1958).
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for a limited period of years.' 2 These statutes are similar to the
recording acts since they do not destroy interests and claims directly;
rather, it is the failure of the owner to preserve his interests by
recording that causes their extinguishment. 1 3  The intent of these
"title marketability" statutes is to make title searches simpler and
more reasonable in terms of time and cost.
In New York, the Law Revision Commission published reports
in 1951 and 1958 discussing the legislation of other states and the
advisability of the adoption of similar provisions.' 4 It recommended
that the legislature adopt automatic and inexpensive means to free
lands of restrictions which have been forgotten or virtually aban-
doned by their owners. The Commission recommended a statute
which would require the recording of these limitations on land, and
it was of the opinion that such a statute would be constitutional,
since it would be analogous to mortgage recording statutes which
had been previously upheld.15
The legislation finally adopted to deal with these problems in
New York included Sections 345-349 of the New York Real Prop-
erty Law.16 The section which the Court invalidated in the instant
case required the recording of an intention to preserve possibilities
of reverter and rights of re-entry which had been created prior to
September 1, 1931.17 Under the statute, owners of these rights
were required to record their intention to preserve on or before
September 1, 1961, and to renew the recording every ten years.
The law also provided that new restrictions would be recordable
not less than twenty-seven years, nor more than thirty years after
their creation. The legislation was believed to be beneficial, since
it was designed to improve the alienability of real property by clear-
ing land titles which otherwise would have remained encumbered
with impractical limitations.18
In holding New York Real Property Law Section 345(4)
unconstitutional as applied to the facts in the instant case, the
Court traced the line of cases which have held that recording acts
are constitutional, and conceded that if this were a true recording
act it could be applied retroactively to impair the obligation of con-
12 E.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§26.1271-79 (1953); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 541.023 (1947).
13 Aigler, supra note 9, at 199.
14 1951 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAw RmsioN CoMM'N REP. (P).
151951 N.Y. LEa. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW REVISION Comm.'N REP. (P)
29. See Conley v. Barton, 260 U.S. 677 (1923); Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S.
514 (1883), which upheld statutes requiring mortgagees who had not taken
possession under mortgages given prior to the enactment of the statute, to
refile at stated intervals to preserve their liens.
16 N.Y. RAL Pop. LAW §§346-49 (now embodied in N.Y. RPAPL
§§ 1951-55).
1' N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 345 (4).
18 Sparks, Future Interests, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1193, 1198 (1958).
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tracts. 9 It also distinguished this statute from the standard type
of recording act, the purpose of which is to prevent fraud. 20 Focus-
ing on section 345, the Court observed that protection of subsequent
purchasers was not within the purview of the statute, and found
that the impairment of contractual obligations was, in this case, an
unjustifiable exercise of the police power.21
With respect to due process, the Court concluded that it would
be unjust to allow the possibility of reverter and re-entry interests
to be destroyed since persons with these claims might be ignorant
of their rights or of the requirements of the statute. It stated:
If subdivision 4 of section 345 of the Real Property Law be valid
under these circumstances, at least, it would be necessary for unascer-
tained persons, perhaps not even in being, to have recorded a declara-
tion of intention to preserve a reverter which would not take effect in
enjoyment until an indefinite future time.22
Although the Court found that the statute could not be justified
under the police power, it has been said that the police power is the
least limitable of the powers of government and that it extends to
all the great public needs.2 3  The United States Supreme Court has
stated:
the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not
prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for
the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good
of the public, though contracts previously entered into between in-
dividuals may thereby be affected. 24
Assuming that the promotion of the alienability of land is necessary
for the public good, it would appear that the police power is broad
enough so that Section 345 of the New York Real Property Law
could be encompassed therein. However, if the act were sustained
under the police power, the objection remains that property is being
taken in violation of due process. This objection has been obviated
in other states by providing a reasonable time within which the
interest can be protected by means of recording.25 The statute
under discussion in the present case allowed three years for the
recording of special limitations which stemmed from documents
9 Board of Educ. v. Miles, 15 N.Y2d 364, 369-70, 207 N.E.2d 181, 184-85,
259 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133-34 (1965).
20 Id. at 368, 207 N.E.2d at 183, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 132-33.21 1d. at 370, 207 N.E.2d at 185, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
2 2 1d. at 373, 207 N.E.2d at 186, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
23 People v. Nebbia, 262 N.Y. 259, 270, 186 N.E. 694, 699 (1933).
24 Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
25 E.g, MicH. STAT. ANN. §§26.1271-79 (1953); MniN. STAT. ANN.
§ 541.023 (1947).
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more than thirty years old. The proponents of the act, while
anticipating serious objections, nevertheless, felt certain that its
constitutionality would be ultimately upheld.26 As early as 1958,
one commentator predicted that although the retroactive aspect of
the statute would be attacked as a taking without due process, the
opportunity to avoid the taking by the simple act of recording would
be sufficient to assure the statute's validity.
27
It is to be noted that the Court has ruled only on that portion
of the law which refers to deeds creating possibilities of reverter
executed prior to 1931. The entire statute has not yet been in-
validated, but in view of the reasoning in the instant case it is
doubtful whether the Court will uphold the statute as it applies to
those interests created between 1931 and 1961 (the effective cut-off
date of the statute). The prospective provisions of the statute ap-
pear to be safe, however, and thus, possibilities of reverter created
after 1961 will fail unless recorded.
That restrictions can have valid and worthwhile objectives is
not denied, and to condemn all restrictions upon land would be
rather short-sighted. On the other hand, there are many restric-
tions which serve no beneficial purposes and which have been for-
gotten by the owners of the land and by the holders of the rever-
sionary interests. It is apparent that we should distinguish between
antiquated restrictions and those which retain a useful purpose.
A recording act is a valid solution since it allows destruction of the
former upon the failure to record and allows the retention of the
latter by the recordation of an intention to preserve.
TORTS- FIRST RECOGNITION OF "WRONGFUL LIFE" AS VALID
CAUSE OF ACTION. - Due to the state's alleged negligence, a female
incompetent was sexually assaulted while confined in a mental in-
stitution. The plaintiff, conceived as a result of the attack, claimed
tort damages primarily for suffering "the stigma of illegitimacy."
Ruling solely on the sufficiency of the pleading, the New York
Court of Claims held that the infant had a valid cause of action
against the state. Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d
953 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
At common law, life began, from a legal point of view, when
the infant stirred in its mother's womb.' Gradually, a child en ventre
26 1951 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAw REVISION CoMM'N RE'. (B)
32. 27Supra note 18, at 1196.
11 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 129.
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